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1 Introduction
The Ministry of Finance (the MOF), with its strong influence over the government
budget and financial industry, constantly sends its retiring oﬃcials to various or-
ganisations including financial institutions. One of the remarkable features of the
Japanese economy is the relationship between the government and the private sector
through amakudari. The term amakudari literally means “descent from heaven”. In
the context of business and politics in Japan, amakudari can have two meanings. It
can be referred to either the practice of retiring bureaucrats obtaining senior positions
in private firms, public corporations and government aﬃliated special associations,
or the retired government oﬃcials per se in these high ranked positions. Amakudri
approximately corresponds to the term “revolving door” in the United States.1
The functions and roles of amakudari in the government-business relationship
have been mainly studied by foreign researchers, in an attempt to identify the secrets
of Japan’s high growth period. The amakudari practice is sometimes understood as a
direct and eﬀective tool for implementing regulation. It is also viewed as an informal
communication mechanism between the government and business sector, which helps
in the exchange of views on business and regulation policies.
The rise of the Jusen problem, however, has cast doubt over the amakudari prac-
tice in the financial industry. Jusen is a class of financial institutions, originally
specialising in housing loans, which were set up by city banks in the early 1970s.
Faced by a slowdown in lending to blue chip firms in the 1980s, city banks themselves
started providing housing loans at lower mortgage rates than Jusen companies. Con-
sequently, Jusen companies gradually shifted their business to supply funds to risky
industries, for example, the real estate industry. The bad loans in Jusen companies
reached unmanageable amounts by the mid 1990s due to the burst of the asset-price
bubble at the beginning of 1990. The MOF desperately attempted to rescue the Jusen
companies. At first, the MOF secretly sought for a solution to the problem with the
assistance of city banks, but eventually ended up injecting taxpayers’ money into the
rescue plan. An embarrassing fact emerged during the discussion over the rescue plan
in the Diet: with only one exception, all of the presidents of the Jusen companies
were retired Ministry of Finance bureaucrats. Moreover, amakudari oﬃcials from the
MOF occupied a considerable number of managerial positions.2
The objective of this paper is to examine the amakudari practice and its im-
plication in the Japanese banking system under a game theoretic framework. Our
paper is the first attempt to analyse the amakudari practice within a game theoretic
framework, where all the economic literature regarding the amakudari practice has
been purely empirical (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001, Suzuki, 2001, van Rixtel, 2002,
1However, amakudari is slightly diﬀerent from “revolving door”. In the amakudari practice, post
retirement jobs are arranged by the secretariat of ministries. The amakudari practice is usually a
long-term relationship between ministries and firms that accept amakudari oﬃcials.
2See Nikkei Shimbunsha (2000) for more details of the Jusen problem.
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and Yamori, 1998). We consider a game in which there is asymmetric information
between depositors and banks where the riskiness of each bank is private information.
That is, riskiness is observable for individual banks but not observable to depositors.
Banks with diﬀerent degrees of risk can use amakudari oﬃcials as a signal of their
riskiness. Our model predicts various equilibria depending upon (1) productivity of
oﬃcials, (2) depositor’s risk aversion, and (3) the riskiness of banks. Some interest-
ing equilibria include ones where amakudari oﬃcials are hired even when they are
unproductive for banks. We discuss the veracity of equilibria in view of the Japanese
economy during the bubble and its preceding periods (1977-1990). Our discussion
suggests that, in contrast to what the existing empirical literature has found, (1)
the existence of the amakudari practice might have weakened the MOF’s general
prudential regulation in the banking industry, and (2) the amakudari practice as an
incentive scheme for the MOF oﬃcials could be important.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 overviews the amakudari
practice, discusses its functions, and reviews the previous literature. Section 3 de-
velops our model and discusses various equilibria and their veracity, particularly in
relation to the existing empirical literature. Section 4 concludes.
2 The amakudari practice and its functions
As with many other distinct features of the modern Japanese political and economic
system, the amakudari practice appeared after the World War II. Two primary regu-
lations have controlled the practice. First, The National Public Service Law (Kokka
Komuin Ho) prohibits retiring bureaucrats from having a job in a company that they
used to regulate for at least two years after their retirement. If bureaucrats want to
be employed by a private company during this two-year period, approval must be ob-
tained from the National Personnel Authority (Jinji In). Second, retiring bureaucrats
themselves must not go out and seek these job opportunities. Instead, the National
Personnel Authority is legally responsible for post-retirement personnel administra-
tion. However, in the actual process of amakudari for a retiring bureaucrat, the
secretary of each ministry (Kanbocho) negotiates with firms and other organisations
in order to arrange the position.
This is also true for the MOF. Jobs arranged by the secretariat are usually ranked
in accordance with a bureaucrat’s last position in the MOF. Some posts are called
“shiteiseki” (reserved seats), specially provided for retired vice ministers. These
are usually the heads of public corporations including the governor of the Bank of
Japan. In the business sector, retired bureaucrats have been taking senior positions
in regional and trust banks. For example, the Bank of Yokohama has accepted MOF
oﬃcials as its president three times in a row. Smaller banks also regularly take retired
oﬃcials. The Jusen related documents, which had been revealed in the Diet, showed
that 138 former MOF oﬃcials occupied the positions as presidents or members of
the board in 96 banks – approximately 60 per cent of all banks (Mukaidani et al.,
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1994). Every year from 1977 to 1990 (the bubble and its preceding periods hereafter),
more than 100 amakudari oﬃcials obtained their jobs in 125 regional banks in Japan
(Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001).
Three possible major roles of the amakudari practice have been identified in pre-
vious studies.3 First, the amakudari practice is regarded as a mechanism that enables
the government to implement eﬀective industrial policies and prudential regulations.
van Rixtel (2002) calls this “ex-post monitoring” since the MOF amakudari oﬃcials
are located in the troubled banks as “watchdogs” who monitors their prudential be-
haviour. Second, it may be a lifelong incentive scheme for bureaucrats, in which the
expectation of senior positions with a high salary in private firms after retirement mo-
tivates bureaucrats to work hard while they are employed by ministries for a relatively
low salary. Third, the amakudari practice can be working to equalising competitive-
ness amongst diﬀerent companies in their business scales, location, profitability, etc.
This type of amakudari is called “buying influence” by van Rixtel (2002) because
banks are eﬀectively buying influence on the MOF – the former MOF oﬃcials can
potentially bend the rules by pursuading the MOF, and banks can increase risky but
profitable lending.
The functions of the amakudari practice have been an attractive topic to political
scientists, foreign scholars in particular. Many studies have been actively conducted
by foreign political scientists in this field. Economists, however, were not so much
concerned with the role of the amakudari practice as political scientists were. Only
a small set of literature deals with amakudari problems within the framework of
economics, and hence it is not surprising that there are only very limited economic
studies focusing on the relationship between the MOF and regulated banks. Within
this small set of literature, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001), Suzuki (2001), van Rix-
tel (2002), and Yamori (1998) are major contributors to the economic analysis of
amakudari oﬃcials from the MOF. Their studies are empirical within the frame-
work of economics, and show negative implications of the amakudari practice for
disciplining banks’ behaviour.
van Rixtel (2002) has conducted empirical analysis and has concluded that the
amakudari practice based on ”buying influence” is important in the Japanese banking
industry. He has shown that banks’ profitability has a negative eﬀect on the inflow
of amakudari oﬃcials, which implies that banks demand amakudari oﬃcials when
they are troubled and try bending the rules using these oﬃcials who have connection
with the MOF. Meanwhile, in the same empirical work, van Rixtel (2002) rejects two
other roles of the amakudari practice. His estimation shows that the appointment
of amakudari oﬃcials have eﬀects on banks’ various performance variables such as
profitability, implying that the amakudari practice is not merely a reward system or
an incentive scheme for the MOF oﬃcials. He finds that profitability of banks that
accepted amakudari oﬃcials have improved in subsequent periods, but also finds that
3See Shaede (1995) and van Rixtel (2001). Che (1995) and Salant (1995) show that the practice
of the “revolving door” can be socially useful.
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those banks have increased lending to risky industries, hence rejecting his “ex-post
monitoring” hypothesis.
This last empirical finding by van Rixtel (2001), which says that accepting amaku-
dari oﬃcials leads to banks’ non-prudential behaviour, has also been pointed out by
a few other empirical studies . Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) discuss that the amaku-
dari practice is a form of collusion between a regulator and regulated banks and
enables them to pursue their own benefits at the expense of taxpayers’ welfare. In
other words, the amakudari practice has a negative eﬀect on the MOF’s role as a
regulator on behalf of the public. Their empirical analysis where they tested the
banks who accepted amakudari oﬃcials from the MOF tended to engage in greater
risk-taking than banks who did not accept amakudari MOF oﬃcials during the bub-
ble and its preceding periods. Banks that accepted amakudari oﬃcials tended to
have a higher bad-loan ratio than the banks that did not. An empirical study by
Suzuki (2001) extends their analysis to the post-bubble period, and has also found a
negative relationship between the inflow of amakudari oﬃcials and banks’ prudential
behaviour.
Yamori (1998) also studies the eﬀect of the amakudari practice in the Japanese
banking industry, using the theoretical framework of the expense preference behav-
iours of financial institutions. He relates the amakudari practice to the expense-
preference hypothesis and tests this relationship based on the data of Shinkin banks
– a kind of mutual funds. He finds that the financial institutions with amakudari
oﬃcials had more employees than those without. This finding is consistent with his
hypothesis that the amakudari practice has a negative eﬀect on corporate governance
by creating a cozy relation between the regulator and regulated banks.
Whilst the existing empirical literature has commonly pointed out that accepting
amakudari oﬃcials leads to banks’ non-prudential behaviour, there appears to be
no common agreement as to whether amakudari oﬃcials are productive for private
banks. Aside from van Rixtel (2002), no economic research has been conducted
regarding amakudari oﬃcials productivity on private banks. As explained earlier,
van Rixtel (2002) finds a positive eﬀect of amakudari oﬃcials on banks’ profitability
in subsequent periods. However, this finding does not appear to be robust because
(1) the majority of the estimates are statistically significant at only 10 per cent, and
(2) the economic eﬀects appear to be trivial. The change in profitability (net return
on equity) ranges from −14 per cent to 7.8 per cent, whereas accepting an amakudari
oﬃcial aﬀects a bank’s profitability by no more than 0.4 percentage points, which
appears to be economically insignificant. In our signalling model, therefore, we
will investigate cases where amakudari oﬃcials are productive and unproductive for
private banks. Equilibria that emerge diﬀer according to productivity of amakudari
oﬃcials and we discuss the veracity of those equilibria in view of findings in the
previous empirical literature.
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3 The Model
This section starts with setting up a signalling model in which a bank is the sender of
signals and a depositor is the receiver of the signals. We consider two types of a bank,
safe and risky. We consider cases where amakudari oﬃcials are productive for both
banks, only for a safe bank, only for a risky bank, and for neither banks. We rank
expected payoﬀs for a depositor and a bank for these four cases in order to discuss
possible equilibria under each setting. Then we choose 4 interesting scenarios and
discuss the veracity of those in relation to the previous empirical literature.
3.1 The Setup
There are two players: a risk-neutral bank and a risk-averse depositor. A depositor
is endowed with one unit of term-deposit in a bank on the promise that the bank pays
out G > 1 at the end of the period. However, she does not know the riskiness of the
bank where she deposits her money. The depositor can take two actions: keeping
the deposit in the bank until maturity or withdrawing before maturity. The timing
of the game is as follows: (1) Nature chooses whether a bank is a safe bank or a risky
bank. A bank can safe (S) with probablility s and risky (R) with probability 1− s
and the probability distribution over bank types is common knowledge; (2) Knowing
its own type as private information, the bank decides whether to accept amakudari
oﬃcials, which costs the bank C.; (3) After a depositor observes the bank’s choice, she
decides whether to keep her deposit in the bank until maturity.; (4) If the depositor
withdraws her deposit before maturity, the bank must liquidate its project. If a
bank faces liquidation before maturity, a depositor can recover a total of L < 1.
Otherwise, the bank completes the project. If a bank accepts amakudari oﬃcials
from the regulatory authority and if a depositor decides to withdraw her money before
maturity, regardless of a bank’s type, a bank’s return is zero and a depositor’s return
is L − C. Since a bank has the limited liability, the cost of amakudari oﬃcials C
has to be paid from the liquidation value L. On the other hand, if a bank does not
accept amakudari oﬃcials and if a depositor decides to withdraw her money before
maturity, regardless of a bank’s type, a depositor’s return is L and a bank’s return is
zero.
In the case where a depositor keeps her money in a bank until maturity, the project
will be completed. A safe bank invests in a safe project, which pays out Y ≥ G at
the end of the period with certainty, if it does not accept amakudari oﬃcials. If it
does, the return becomes YA ≥ G. We assume that it costs a bank C to accept
amakudari oﬃcials. Then, it is always profitable for a safe bank to hire amakudari
oﬃcials when YA − C > Y , as long as strategic interactions are not concerned. We
define the productivity of amakudari oﬃcials for the safe bank as follows:
Definition 1 Amakudari oﬃcials are productive for a safe bank if YA − C > Y .
6
Figure 1: A game tree with the expected returns
A safe bank’s return is YA −G−C if amakudari oﬃcials are accepted, or Y −G
otherwise. For a depositor, if her deposit is in a safe bank, regardless of whether the
bank accepts amakudari oﬃcials, her return is G.
In turn, a risky bank invests in a risky project in which the return at maturity
y ≥ 0 is a random variable. It is subject to a probability distribution with mean y if
it does not hire amakudari oﬃcials, but we assume that the probability distribution
shifts positively by a certain amount if it hires amakudari oﬃcials and that the mean
becomes yA . Since a bank is risk neutral, it is more profitable for it to hire amakudari
oﬃcials when yA−C > y, as long as strategic interactions are not concerned. Hence
the following definition:
Definition 2 Amakudari oﬃcials are productive for a risky bank if yA − C > y .
Since the return on a risky project is random, the return for depositing in a risky
bank is also random. For a risky bank, the expected return is max (yA −G− C, 0)
if amakudari oﬃcials are accepted, or max (y −G, 0) otherwise. The return for the
depositor may be less thanG if the realisation value of yA or y is not high enough, since
a bank has limited liability. More specifically, if her deposit is in a risky bank, her
expected return is max [min (G, yA − C) , 0] if the bank accepts amakudari oﬃcials,
or min (G, y) otherwise. We summarise the above information in a game tree of the
expected returns as in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: A game tree with the expected payoﬀs
3.2 Ranking of expected payoﬀs
The expected returns on the game tree in Figure 1 can be read as the expected payoﬀs
only if both a bank and a depositor are risk-neutral, which is not the case. We need to
take into accout the risk-aversion of a depositor and rank expected payoﬀs for a bank
and a depositor. We denote the expected profits for a bank by π(a1, a2, t). a1 is the
bank’s action whether to accept (A) or not to accept (N) amakudari oﬃcials, hence
a1 ∈ {A,N}. a2 is the depositor’s action whether to keep (K) or withdraw (W ) her
deposits, hence a2 ∈ {K,W}. t is the type of the bank, hence t ∈ {S,R}. Likewise,
we denote the expected utility of a depositor by U(a1, a2, t). Hence, the game tree
of the expected payoﬀs is as in Figure 2. Now we rank the payoﬀs according to the
productivity of amakudari oﬃcials.
3.2.1 Case I: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive for both banks
As for the profits, we only need to rank the top and the bottom halves separately,
because once the nature chooses the type, these banks are diﬀerent. For a safe bank,
when a depositor keeps her depositor, by definition π(A,K, S) > π(N,K, S). When a
depositor withdraws, the project is not completed, and the bank with its limited liabil-
ity will get nothing regardless of its hiring action. Hence, π(A,K, S) > π(N,K,S) >
π(A,W,S) = π(N,W,S). Likewise, for a risky bank, when a depositor keeps her
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depositor, by definition π(A,K,R) > π(N,K,R), and these are preferred to the case
where a depositor withdraws. Hence, π(A,K,R) > π(N,K,R) > π(A,W,R) =
π(N,W,R). We assign numbers 3 (best), 2, and 1 (worst), respectively, to them,
without loss of generality.
As for the depositor’s expected utility levels, we need to compare 8 diﬀerent ones.
In the case where amakudari oﬃcials are productive for both banks, we naturally have
three restrictions on the levels of expected utility. First, U(A,K, S) = U(N,K,S)
is the greatest because there is no risk and the depositor is guaranteed the return
of G as promised. Second, U(N,W,S) = U(N,W,R) > U(A,W,S) = U(A,W,R),
because in case of withdrawal, a depositor ends up getting L with certainty if the
bank’s action is N , but L − C with certainty if its action is A. Finally, since the
probability distribution of the return for the risky project shifts by hiring amakudari
oﬃcials, when they are productive, U(A,K,R) > U(N,K,R) holds.4
There are 6 possible combinations of ranking of depositor’s expected utility. We
assign numbers 5 (best) to 1 (worst) to these expected utility levels. Table 1 sum-
marises all the possible cases.
Scenarios (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
U(A,K, S) 5 5 5 5 5 5
U(N,K, S) 5 5 5 5 5 5
U(N,W,S) 3 2 3 4 4 4
U(N,W,R) 3 2 3 4 4 4
U(A,W,S) 2 1 1 2 1 3
U(A,W,R) 2 1 1 2 1 3
U(A,K,R) 4 4 4 3 3 2
U(N,K,R) 1 3 2 1 2 1
Table 1: Depositor’s Payoﬀ Ranking: Cases I and III
3.2.2 Case II: When amakudari oﬃcials are unproductive for both banks
We again start with a bank. For a safe bank, when a depositor keeps her deposit,
by definition π(A,K, S) < π(N,K, S). When a depositor withdraws, the project
is not completed, and the bank with its limited liability will get nothing regardless
of its hiring action. Hence, π(N,K,S) > π(A,K, S) > π(A,W,S) = π(N,W,S).
Likewise, for a risky bank, when a depositor keeps her depositor, by definition
π(A,K,R) < π(N,K,R), and these are preferred to the case where a depositor with-
draws. Hence, π(N,K,R) > π(A,K,R) > π(A,W,R) = π(N,W,R). We assign
numbers 3 (best), 2, and 1 (worst), respectively, to them, without loss of generality.
4It means that the probability distribution of return for the risky project with amakudari oﬃcials
first-order stochastically dominates that without.
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As for the depositor’s expected utility levels, we again need to compare 8 diﬀer-
ent ones. The natural restrictions we have on the levels of expected utility are the
following. First, again U(A,K, S) = U(N,K,S), is the greatest because there is
no risk and the depositor is guaranteed the return of G.5 Second, U(N,W,S) =
U(N,W,R) > U(A,W,S) = U(A,W,R) again should hold, because in case of with-
drawal, a depositor ends up getting L with certainty if the bank’s action is N , but
L − C with certainty if its action is A. Finally, as we did in Case I, we have a
restriction regarding expected utilitly levels of the risky project with and without
amakudari oﬃcials, U(A,K,R) < U(N,K,R). The inequality is reversed from Case
I because oﬃcials are unproductive in Case II.
As in Case I, there are 6 possible combinations of ranking of depositor’s expected
utility. We assign numbers 5 (best) to 1 (worst) to these expected utility levels,
which are summarised in Table 2.
Scenarios (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
U(A,K, S) 5 5 5 5 5 5
U(N,K, S) 5 5 5 5 5 5
U(N,W,S) 4 2 4 4 3 3
U(N,W,R) 4 2 4 4 3 3
U(A,W,S) 3 1 2 1 1 2
U(A,W,R) 3 1 2 1 1 2
U(A,K,R) 1 3 1 2 2 1
U(N,K,R) 2 4 3 3 4 4
Table 2: Depositor’s Payoﬀ Ranking for Cases II and IV
3.2.3 Case III: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive only for a risky
bank
For a safe bank, when a depositor keeps her deposit, by definition π(A,K, S) >
π(N,K,S). When a depositor withdraws, the project is not completed, and the
bank with its limited liability will get nothing regardless of its hiring action. Hence,
π(A,K, S) > π(N,K, S) > π(A,W, S) = π(N,W, S). Likewise, for a risky bank,
when a depositor keeps her depositor, by definition π(A,K,R) < π(N,K,R), and
these are preferred to the case where a depositor withdraws. Hence, π(N,K,R) >
π(A,K,R) > π(A,W,R) = π(N,W,R). We assign numbers 3 (best), 2, and 1
(worst), respectively, to them, without loss of generality.
As for the depositor’s expected utility levels, ranking should be the same as in
Case I, so Table 1 is relevant.
5We assume that YA − C > G holds.
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3.2.4 Case IV: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive only for a safe
bank
For a safe bank, when a depositor keeps her depositor, by definition π(A,K, S) >
π(N,K,S). When a depositor withdraws, the project is not completed, and the
bank with its limited liability will get nothing regardless of its hiring action. Hence,
π(A,K, S) > π(N,K, S) > π(A,W, S) = π(N,W, S). Likewise, for a risky bank,
when a depositor keeps her depositor, by definition π(A,K,R) < π(N,K,R), and
these are preferred to the case where a depositor withdraws. Hence, π(N,K,R) >
π(A,K,R) > π(A,W,R) = π(N,W,R). We assign numbers 3 (best), 2, and 1
(worst), respectively, to them, without loss of generality. As for the depositor’s
expected utility levels, ranking should be the same as in Case II, so Table 2 is relevant.
Before delving into analysing equilibria, let us point out the similarity of Cases
III and IV to the job-market signalling model by Spence (1973). In Spence (1973),
a low productive worker finds signalling (obtaining education) more costly than a
high productive worker does. Cases III (IV) corresponds to the case where a safe
(risky) bank finds signalling, i.e., accepting amakudari oﬃcials, more costly than a
risky (safe) bank does.
3.3 Equilibria
Because examining all 24 scenarios is a little tedious, we shall only discuss ones that
we think are interesting and important. For scenarios which will not be discussed
in the text, the list of possible equilibria will be provided in Appendix. Throughout
the analysis, we use the following notations. Regarding banks’ strategy, we denote
it by a combination of two actions, for example, (A,N), where the first argument
corresponds to the safe bank’s action. Regarding the depositor’s strategy, we denote
it by a combination of two actions as well, for instance, (K,N). The first argument
K corresponds to the sequentially rational action at the information set following the
bank’s action A, and the second argument N corresponds to the sequentially rational
action at the information set following the bank’s action N . As for the depositor’s
belief, we use notations such as (0,1), which means that the depositor assigns the
probability zero for a bank to be safe, and assigns one for a bank to be risky.
3.3.1 Scenario 1
The scenario we investigate first is where amakudari oﬃcials are productive for both
banks. It turns out that as long as U(A,K,R) > U(A,W, S) = U(A,W,R), we have
an (A,A) pooling equilibrium. This inequality requires a depositor to be not too
risk averse and/or the risky project to be not too risky, since either way it works to
increase U(A,K,R), expected utility for the depositor from keeping her deposit in a
risky bank when it accepts amakudari oﬃcials. Let us look at Scenario (c) of Case
I where we have the following game tree.
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Figure 3: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive for both banks
We can tell that no separating equilibrium exists. When (A,N), then (K,W ) is
the sequentially rational strategy for a depositor. But then, a risky bank will mimic
a safe bank and the equilibrium collapses. Likewise, when (N,A), then (K,K) is
the sequentially rational strategy for a depositor, in which case, a safe bank will
mimic a risky bank As for a pooling equilibrium, (N,N) cannot be an equilibrium
for the following reason. Whatever the value s takes, W must be the strategy for the
depositor at the information set that follows the bank’s strategy A. Otherwise, banks
have an incentive to deviate from the strategy N . However, at that information
set, K is the dominant strategy, and hence the equilibrium collapses. (A,A) remains
to be the only possible equilibrium, and in fact, it is supported by whatever belief a
depositor has at the other information set. This is because the equilibrium payoﬀ
of the bank is 3 regardless of the depositor’s action, which strictly dominates bank’s
payoﬀ when it’s strategy is N regardless of the depositor’s action.
3.3.2 Scenario 2
Let us compare this (A,A) equilibrium with the (A,A) equilibrium where amakudari
oﬃcials are unproductive for both banks. It turns out the condition for an (A,A)
pooling equilibrium for this case is U(N,W,S) = U(N,W,R) > U(N,K,R). In plain
words, it means that a depositor is reasonably risk averse and/or the risky project is
very risky – hence the condition is opposite to Scenario 1. We look at Scenario (c)
of Case II where we have the following game tree:
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Figure 4: When amakudari oﬃcials are unproductive for both banks
The similar argument holds in showing the non-existence of a separating equilib-
rium. When (A,N), then (K,W ) is the sequentially rational strategy for a depositor.
But then, a risky bank will mimic a safe bank and the equilibrium collapses. Like-
wise, when (N,A), then (K,W ) is the sequentially rational strategy for a depositor,
in which case, again a risky bank mimics a safe bank As for a pooling equilibrium,
both (N,N) and (A,A) exist. In the (N,N) equilibrium, for high enough s, K is the
sequentially rational strategy for the depositor. Whatever belief in the other infor-
mation set supports this equilibrium, hence (W,K) or (K,K) are possible strategies
for the depositor. For low enough s, W becomes sequentially rational for the depos-
itor, in which case, W must be sequentially rational for the depositor at the other
information set, too. Belief such as (0,1) supports this equilibrium, and it survives
the Intuitive Criterion. As for the (A,A) equilibrium, by the same token we can con-
clude that for low enough s, there exists belief that supports the depositor’s strategy
(W ,W ), and for high enough s, there exists belief such that (K,W ) is supported.
3.3.3 Scenario 3
Let us now look at two scenarios under which a separating equilibrium emerges. We
look at Scenario (a) of Case III where we have the following game tree:
It turns out that as long as U(A,K,R) > U(A,W,S) = U(A,W,R), we have an
(N,A) separating equilibrium, where a safe bank always does not accept amakudari
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Figure 5: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive only for a risky bank
oﬃcials whilst a risky bank always does. This condition is the same as one for
an (A,A) pooling equilibrium when oﬃcials are productive for both banks, and it
requires a depositor to be not too risk averse and/or the risky project to be not
too risky, since either way it works to increase U(A,K,R), expected utility for the
depositor from keeping her deposit in a risky bank when it accepts amakudari oﬃcials.
If this does not hold (but only in one scenario) we end up with having unrealistic
pooling equilibria, where neither of a bank accepts oﬃcials. We can tell that another
separating equilibrium, (A,N), does not exist. When (A,N), then (K,W ) is the
sequentially rational strategy for a depositor. But then, a risky bank will mimic a
safe bank and so the equilibrium collapses. A pooling equilibrium, (N,N), cannot
be sustained for the following reason. Depending on the value of s, either K or
W will be the sequentially rational strategy at the information set on equilibrium.
Regardless of this strategy, W must be sequentially rational for the depositor at the
other information set, in order for both banks not to deviate. However, this is
impossible since K is the dominant strategy at that information set. In plain words,
a risky bank deviates since it prefers not to mimic a safe bank. The other pooling
equilibrium, (A,A), cannot be sustained for a diﬀerent reason. At the information
set on equilibrium, K is the dominant strategy for the depositor, so W has to be
sequentially rational for the depositor at the other information set, in order for both
banks not to deviate. Some belief such as (0,1) will support this strategy. However,
this equilibrium is not natural. The belief (0,1) at the information set oﬀ-equilibrium
implies that if the depositor sees a bank that does not accept oﬃcials, she regards it
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Figure 6: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive only for a safe bank
is a risky bank. However, the risky bank cannot make its equilibrium payoﬀ better
by deviating, whereas the safe bank can do so if a depositor believes that a bank
that deviates is actually a safe bank. Hence, assigning the belief (1,0) is the natural
choice in this case, in which case the (A,A) equilibrium collapses. Put it shortly,
the Intuitive Criterion eliminates the (A,A) equilibrium. Hence we are left with an
(N,A) separating equilibrium, and (K,K) is the only sequentially rational strategy
for the depositor.
3.3.4 Scenario 4
The other separating equilibrium (A,N) can be seen in Case IV. Under three scenar-
ios in Case IV we have a unique separating equilibrium (A,N) with the depositor’s
strategy (K,K). It turns out the condition for the (A,N) separating equilibrium in
Case IV is U(N,K,R) > U(N,W,S) = U(N,W,R), which is opposite to the condi-
tion under Scenario 2. So let us investigate what happens if this condition is violated
and so the same conditions to Scenario 2 holds. We look at Scenario (a) in particular.
Figure 6 describes the game tree.
First, both separating equilibria are eliminated. When (A,N), then (K,W ) is
the sequentially rational strategy for a depositor. But then, a risky bank will mimic
a safe bank and the equilibrium collapses. Likewise, when (N,A), then (K,W )
is the sequentially rational strategy for a depositor, in which case, again a risky
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bank mimics a safe bank Second, a pooling equilibrium, (N,N) with the depositor’s
strategy (W,W ), exists. In the (N,N) equilibrium, for high enough s, K is the
sequentially rational strategy for the depositor. W must be sequentially rational
for the depositor at the other information set, and belief such as (0,1) supports this
equilibrium. However, it does not survive the Intuitive Criterion. For low enough s,
W becomes sequentially rational for the depositor on equilibrium, in which case, W
must be sequentially rational for the depositor at the other information set. Belief
such as (0,1) supports this equilibrium, and in this case, it survives the Intuitive
Criterion. Lastly, the (A,A) equilibrium with depositor’s strategy (K,W ) or (W,W ),
exists. For low enough s, there exists belief that supports the depositor’s strategy
(W ,W ), and for high enough s, there exists belief such that (K,W ) is supported.
These equilibria survive the Intuitive Criterion.
3.4 Discussion
Amongst various equilibria, we rule out an (N,N) pooling equilibrium as an unrealis-
tic case, since it does not explain the fact that many oﬃcials were employed from 1977
to 1990. We also disregard equilibria with the depositor’s strategy (W,W ), since it
corresponds to bank-runs in all banks, which we did not witness. The scenarios we
have investigated can be classified into two good scenarios (1 and 3), a bad scenario
(2), and a potentially bad scenario (4).
Scenario 1 is good because both banks accept amakudari oﬃcials who are pro-
ductive to them. A depositor’s action on equilibrium is K. Note that for this
equilibrium to emerge, it is necessary for U(A,K,R) > U(A,W,S) = U(A,W,R) to
hold. That is, the depositor ranks keeping her depositor in a risky bank with the
oﬃcials higher than withdrawing her deposit from a bank that hire oﬃcials. If we
assume the depositor to be reasonably risk averse, then the risky bank’s project needs
to be not too risky, i.e., the certainty equivalent of the return has to be high enough.
It is a good scenario since the risky bank hires amakudari oﬃcials and its project is
quite likely be successful.
Similar to this is Scenario 3. A safe bank does not accept amakudari oﬃcials but
a risky bank does. They are productive only for the risky bank, so this outcome is
eﬃcient in that sense. Depositor keeps her deposit on equilibrium, which is desiable,
since the safe project is, by definition, safe and profitable, and the risky project
is promising, since the condition for this equilibrium U(A,K,R) > U(A,W,S) =
U(A,W,R), which is the same as Scenario 1, has to be met.
Might these scenarios describe the Japanese economy during the bubble and its
preceding periods? Depositors have witnessed many financial institutions collapse
during the past decade, and banks that accepted amakudari oﬃcials were not immune
to this finaicial distress. After the bubble burst at the beginning of the 1990s, we
have witnessed the growing amount of non-performing loans in the banking sector,
which eventually forced the Japanese government to prepare public funds worth 60
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trillion Japanese Yen as of March 1999. These good scenarios do not appear to
describe the bad situation in the Japanese economy, although of course we do not
deny the importance of factors that our model does not account for.
Investigation of the rest of the scenarios is quite interesting. Scenario 2 is where
amakudari oﬃcials are productive for neither of the banks. However, even so, both
banks accept amakudari oﬃcials since not accepting leads to withdrawals by the
depositor, hence liquidation of the project. This scenario is ineﬃcient in that sense.
In addition, note that the condition for this pooling equilibrium is U(N,W, S) =
U(N,W,R) > U(N,K,R). It means that, given a depositor’s risk aversion, the
inequality is likely to be met the riskier the risky project. That is, the depositor
keeps her deposit in a risky bank even if the project the bank has is very risky,
because she believes the bank is actually safe. This is a terrible scenario because
unproductive amakudari oﬃcials are hired and paid in order to trick the depositor,
and due to that she is in jeopardy of losing her funds. Note that if the inequality
is not met, it implies a unique equilibrium is (N,N) where neither of banks hires
amakudari oﬃcials.
Scenario 4 can be as bad as this one. If U(N,K,R) > U(N,W, S) = U(N,W,R)
is met, then a safe bank accepts the oﬃcials who are productive for them, but a risky
bank does not accept the oﬃcials who are unproductive for them (this is an (A,N)
separating equilibrium). So this outcome is eﬃcient in that sense. Depositor’s
strategy on equilibrium is (K,K) so she keeps her deposit for either bank, which
is desiable, since the safe project is by definition safe and profitable, and the risky
project is promising from the inequality. However, if this inequality is reversed,
which is the same as in the terrible scenario we previously saw, we might get the
(A,A) pooling equilibrium where both banks accept amakudari oﬃcials. In this
equilibrium, depositor’s strategy is to keep her deposit. We have a situation where
a risky bank hires and pays unproductive amakudari oﬃcials in order to trick the
depositor. The depositor who actually keeps her deposit in a risky bank is in danger
of losing her funds.
This appears to be consistent with the bad-loan problems in the Japanese banks in
the late 1990s. One possibility is that the MOF shirked the bank monitoring during
the bubble and its preceding periods. One of the explanations of the amakudari
practice in the banking industry is a lifelong incentive scheme for the MOF oﬃcials.
If they are concerned about their future career after their retirement, and if they
are in the position to aﬀect banks’ prudential behaviour through the regulation,
then it might have been the case that they tried to shirk monitoring in the banking
industry. The reason is the following. Lenient monitoring would have lead the
inequality U(N,K,R) > U(N,W, S) = U(N,W,R) to be reveresed to U(N,W, S) =
U(N,W,R) > U(N,K,R). In Scenario 2, this corresponds to a possible change from
(N,N) pooling equilibrium to (A,A) pooling equilibrium, and in Scenario 4, this
corresponds to a change from an (A,N) separating equilibrium to an (A,A) pooling
equilibrium. In both cases, it implies more job opportunities for the amakudari
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oﬃcials after their retirement from the MOF.
This implication from our model is similar to the common agreement that is seen
in the existing empirical literature. Hociuchi and Shimizu (2001), Suzuki (2001), van
Rixtel (2002), and Yamori (1998) all have found that banks that accepted amakudari
oﬃcials tend to behave in a non-prudential manner. Our study suggests the possi-
bility that the existence of the amakudari practice might have weakened the MOF’s
general prudential regulation in the banking sector. As van Rixtel (2002) claims,
the amakudari practice may not be merely an incentive scheme or a reward mecha-
nism for the MOF oﬃcials in the sense that it may aﬀect banks’ performance in the
subsequent periods. However, our story suggests that this incentive scheme per se
might have caused an undesirable equilibrium to emerge. In order for the incentive
scheme to sustain, the MOF needed banks to hire their retiring oﬃcials. Under an
(N,N) pooling equilibrium, it is not possible, whereas this scheme is sustainable in
an (A,A) pooling equilibrium, which emerges when supervision is lenient, but at the
expense of depositors being jeopadised to losing their funds.
We conclude our discussion by making some comments about the reality of our
model in the Japanese banking system. Some might question whether depositors
were that concerned about the banks’ types in Japan. In our model, a depositor’s
main concern is the type of a bank, but in the presence of the Deposit Insurance Law,
how realistic is it? We would consider that a depositor could be concerned about
the type of a bank even though the Law existed. Under the Law, only up to 10
million Japanese Yen per depositor would be protected.6 For big depositors who we
envisaged in our model, the existence of the Law did not mean complete protection
of their deposits.
Our focus has been the static nature of the amakudari practice. Ideally, the
MOF’s attitude towards regulating the banking industry should be incorporated in
the model endogenously, which involves dynamics. Our static model could be re-
garded as the second stage of a two-stage game, in which the first stage being the
MOF’s decision making regarding its attitude towards prudential regulation. Our
model also does not explain a time-persistent nature of the amakudari practice, which
Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) have found. Extending the model to incorporate dy-
namics of the amakudari practice is a possible direction for further research in this
area.
4 Conclusion
We have explored the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system, focusing
particularly upon the relationship between banks and depositors. Our signalling
model predicts various equilibria depending upon (1) productivity of oﬃcials, (2)
depositor’s risk aversion, and (3) the riskiness of banks, and we have related these
6See Nakaso (2001).
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equilibria to the existing literature. We have explained why the amakudari practice
might undermine bank monitoring using a concrete theoretical setting. We have
shown that the existence of the amakudari practice might have weakened the MOF’s
general prudential regulation in the banking sector, because it could have led to more
job opportunities for the retired MOF oﬃcials. This is similar to but is also diﬀerent
from what the existing empirical literature found: Banks that accepted amakudari
oﬃcials tended to show non-prudent behaviour.
After the Jusen problem, there was public outrage directed towards the MOF
for injecting public money into Jusen companies managed by amakudari oﬃcials.
This controversy, combined with several other scandals, culminated in the function
of supervision being taken away from the MOF and transferred to the Financial
Supervisory Agency (FSA) in June 1998. However, the new regulatory regime does
not appear to prevent lenient supervision as long as the amakudari practice remains
unchanged, and so the research concerning the amakudari practice remains important.
Further research should be directed towards both theoretical and empircal stud-
ies. As discussed in the text, our static model has its limitation in explaining the
reality of the amakudari practice – that is, the time-persistent nature. Incorporat-
ing dynamics into our model will be the next theoretical step. At the same time,
incorporating the MOF’s attitude towards the prudential regulation into a dynamic
model could be interesting. Needless to say, in the paper, we have merely presented
suﬃcient conditions for each of equilibria to emerge. We have provided discussion
regarding the veracity of some interesting equilibria, but an intriguing question as to
which of those equilibria was really likely should be addressed empirically.
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A Appendix
We have investigateed equilibria for only limited cases in the text. Here we provide
the summary of all the equilibria for all the scenarios. Equilibria can be obtained in
the way we demostrated in the text, which is available from the authors upon request.
A.1 Case I: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive for
both banks
There is no separating equilibrium. A risky bank always mimics a safe bank so as
to avoid liquidation of the project. In five scenarios, there exists a unique pooling
equilibrium where (A,A) is the bank’s strategy and (K,K), (K,W ), or (W,W ) is
the depositor’s strategy. In the last scenario, in addition to this pooling equilib-
rium, another pooling equilibrium (N,N) emerges where (W,K) or (W,W ) is the
depositor’s strategy. However, this equilibrium does not appear to fit the reality
where 100 amakudari oﬃcials are hired every year in regional banks. As long as
U(A,K,R) > U(A,W, S) = U(A,W,R), we have an (A,A) pooling equilibrium.
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This requires that a depositor is not too risk averse and/or the risky project is not
too risky.
Scenario (A,A) (N,N) (A,N) (N,A)
(a) (K,K) or (K,W ) NO NO NO
(b) (K,K) NO NO NO
(c) (K,K) or (K,W ) NO NO NO
(d) (K,K) or (K,W ) NO NO NO
(e) (K,K) or (K,W ) NO NO NO
(f) (K,K), (K,W ) or (W,W ) (W,K) or (W,W ) NO NO
Table 3: Equilibria for Case I
A.2 Case II: When amakudari oﬃcials are unproductive for
both banks
Again there is no separating equilibrium. Either of banks always mimics a safe bank
so as to avoid liquidation of the project. In three scenarios, there exists a unique
pooling equilibrium where (N,N) is the bank’s strategy and (K,K) or (W,K) is the
depositor’s strategy. In the rest of the scenarios, in addition to this pooling equilib-
rium, the same pooling equilibrium (N,N) with the depositor’s strategy (W,W ) as
well as another pooling equilibrium (A,A) emerge, where for the latter, (K,W ) or
(W,W ) is the depositor’s strategy. The condition for an (A,A) pooling equilibrium
in Case II is U(N,W,S) = U(N,W,R) > U(N,K,R). In plain words, it means that
a depositor is reasonably risk averse and/or the risky project is very bad.
Scenario (A,A) (N,N) (A,N) (N,A)
(a) (W,W ) or (K,W ) (W,W ) , (W,K) or (K,K) NO NO
(b) NO (K,K) NO NO
(c) (W,W ) or (K,W ) (W,W ) , (W,K) or (K,K) NO NO
(d) (K,W ) (W,K) or (K,K) NO NO
(e) NO (K,K) NO NO
(f) NO (W,K) or (K,K) NO NO
Table 4: Equilibria for Case II
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A.3 Case III: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive only
for a risky bank
In five out of six scenarios, there exists a unique separating equilibrium (N,A) with
the depositor’s strategy (K,K). A safe bank does not accept the oﬃcials whilst a
risky bank does always. As long as U(A,K,R) > U(A,W,S) = U(A,W,R), we have
this equilibrium. But when this is reversed, the separating equilibrium vanishes and
two pooling equilibria emerge. One is (N,N) with (W,W ) or (W,K) and the other
is (A,A) with (W,W ).
Scenario (A,A) (N,N) (A,N) (N,A)
(a) NO NO NO (K,K)
(b) NO NO NO (K,K)
(c) NO NO NO (K,K)
(d) NO NO NO (K,K)
(e) NO NO NO (K,K)
(f) (W,W ) (W,K) or (W,W ) NO NO
Table 5: Equilibria for Case III
A.4 Case IV: When amakudari oﬃcials are productive only
for a safe bank
In three scenarios, there exists a unique separating equilibrium (A,N) with the de-
positor’s strategy (K,K). A safe bank accepts the oﬃcials whilst a risky bank does
not. As long as U(N,K,R) > U(N,W, S) = U(N,W,R), we have this equilibrium.
But when this inequality is reversed, the separating equilibrium vanishes and two
pooling equilibria emerge. One is (A,A) with (W,W ) or (K,W ) and the other is
(N,N) with (W,W ).
Scenario (A,A) (N,N) (A,N) (N,A)
(a) (K,W ) or (W,W ) (W,W ) NO NO
(b) NO NO (K,K) NO
(c) (K,W ) or (W,W ) (W,W ) NO NO
(d) (K,W ) NO NO NO
(e) NO NO (K,K) NO
(f) NO NO (K,K) NO
Table 6: Equilibria for Case IV
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